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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3{2)(i)
of the Utah Code.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
I.

Did the trial court improperly apply the law by determining home equity value when

the matter was neither pleaded nor supported by evidence at trial
The standard of appellate review is correction of error, Orton v. Carter. 970 P.2d
1254, (Utah 1998).
II.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it used and arbitrary, capricious and

invalid method for determining home equity value resulting in an unfair award to defendant.
The standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion, (Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch..
860 P.2d 937 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC.
None.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
L

Plaintiff's Complaint, filed on or about September 29, 1999, sought the Court's

determination of the parties' interest in a residence upon real property on three (3) separate
bases: (a) dissolution of partnership and determination of partnership share; (b) quiet title
on the basis on adverse possession; and f c) that defendant had no interest in said property
and her name was on the Deed solely as an accommodation to plaintiff. (Record at pages
1-6).
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2.

Defendant answered, admitted that the parties were in a partnership with

respect to the real property and requested the Court to order the property sold and the equity
divided equally between the parties. (Record at pages 7-8).
3.

A trial on the issues was held on June 6, 2000, and the Court entered Findings,

Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order Quieting Title July 31, 2000. (Record at pages
52-56).
4.

Defendant filed a Motion to Amend Judgment August 9, 2000, (Record at

pages 57-58).
5.

The Court issued an Order on defendant's Motion denying the same October

12, 2000. (Record at pages 77-78).
6.

Defendant filed her Notice of Appeal October 19, 2000, from a final Order

entered in the Fourth District Court, Utah County. (Record at pages 81-82).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
a.

Plaintiff and defendant began living together in August of 1993 and lived

together until October of 1996, at which time they separated. (Record at page 56, Findings,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 1).
b.

Atfirstthe parties lived with plaintiffs mother, but then in September of 1994,

plaintiff and defendant signed as borrower and co-borrower for the purchase of the home
located in American Fork, Utah, and lived together in this home until their separation.
(Record at page 56, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting Title,
paragraph 1).
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c.

The parties did not hold themselves out as husband and wife. (Record at page

56, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 1).
d.

The loan application for the purchase of the American Fork home indicated

that the parties intended to purchase the property as joint tenants while listing themselves as
unmarried persons. (Record at pages 55-56, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment
and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 2).
e.

The parties took title to the property in their separate names as joint tenants.

(Record at pages 55-56, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting
Title, paragraph 2).
f.

The total purchase price for the property was $58,395.26 and $6,995.26 was

paid as a down payment leaving a total balance due of $51,296.75 (sic), (Record at pages
55-56, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 2).
g.

From the time of purchase of the property in September, 1994, until the end

of October, 1996, the parties lived in the home together, pooling their incomes during the
time that each was employed for the benefit of each other, and paying the monthly mortgage
on the home, either from funds contained in a joint bank account or from defendant's
separate bank account. (Record at page 55, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment
and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 3).
h. Plaintiff and defendant, for purposes of purchasing the property in question, held
themselves out as joint tenants, (Record at page 55, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and
Judgment and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 4).
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i. The beginning loan balance due for the property was $51,296,75, and the balance
owing on said loan as of October 31, 1996, the date of separation, was $50,135.78. The
difference between the purchase price and the price at the time defendant left would be the
equity established by payments made. (Record at pages 55 and unnumbered page, Findings,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 5).
j . Neither party presented any evidence for the Court to consider with respect to
appreciation and value of the property from the time of purchase to October 31, 1996, the
time of separation, nor from the time of purchase to the time of trial. Record at page
unnumbered, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting Title,
paragraph 5).
k. After the separation of the parties the plaintiff continued to reside in the home and
pay the monthly mortgage payments, taxes and insurance. No monies were paid by the
defendantfromOctober 31, 1996, to the time of trial. Record at page unnumbered, Findings,
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 7).
1. The 1999 County Property Valuation notice submitted as Exhibit 12 showed a
current valuation of $80,157.00. (Record at page unnumbered).
m. The purchase price of the property was $51,296.75 as of September 14, 1994, and
as of October 31, 1996, the time of separation of the parties, there was $50,135.78 due and
owing on the property. (Record at page unnumbered, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and
Judgment and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 8).
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n.

Equity in the property was determined by subtracting the mortgage balance on

the date the parties separatedfromthe original purchase price. (Record at page unnumbered,
Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting Title, paragraph 6).
0.

Each of the parties should be awarded one-half of the equity in the property.

(Record at page unnumbered, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order
Quieting Title, paragraph 9).
p.

The equity established in the property by evidence is $1,160.97, and defendant

is entitled to $580.48 plus interest as her equity in the property. (Record at page
unnumbered, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order Quieting Title,
paragraphs 8 and 10).
q.

Title to the property is quieted in plaintiffs name against the defendant.

(Record at page unnumbered, Findings, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment and Order
Quieting Title, paragraph 11).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. It was improper for the trial court to determine the amount of the home's equity
because that matter was not pleaded and neither party presented evidence sufficient to
establish that matter.
2. The trial court abused its discretion in determining the home's equity value when
it used an arbitrary, capricious and invalid method. Because determination of equity in real
property requires evidence of its fair market value, when such evidence is not presented, the
trial court cannot create its own formula.

5

ARGUMENT
I. IT WAS IMPROPER FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DETERMINE THE AMOUNT OF
THE HOME'S EQUITY:
Plaintiffs Complaint asks the trial court to declare him the sole owner of the home
owned in joint tenancy by the parties or, to determine what share each of the parties did own.
Defendant's Answer also asks the trial court to determine the percentage of ownership owned
by each of the parties. The trial court heard testimony and took evidence of the
understanding, intent and actions of the parties with respect to ownership and determined
that each owned half and was entitled to one-half of the equity therein. This part of the trial
court's decision is not disputed on appeal.
"Neither party presented any evidence for the Court to consider with respect to
appreciation in value of the propertyfromthe time of purchase to October 31, 1996, the time
of separation, norfromthe time of purchase to time of trial." (Findings, Conclusions of Law
and Judgment and Order Quieting Title at paragraph 5 pages 55 and unnumbered page of the
record). In fact neither party attempted to establish the home's fair market value at trial and
neither party asked the trial court to award him/her a dollar amount for his/her share. Each
of the parties was only asking the trial court to establish the percent share of ownership that
each owned.
It is improper for a trial court to make a ruling on a matter not pleaded and where the
evidence is insufficient to establish that matter. In re: Behm's Estate. 213 P.2d 657, 663
(Utah 1950). Because the trial court had no evidence to support a finding concerning the
amount of the home's equity and because neither of the parties requested such a finding in
6

their pleadings or at trial, the trial court, as in the Behm's Estate case, was barred from
making findings and conclusions on the matter of either fair market value or home equity.
This portion of the judgment must be reversed.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DETERMINING THE HOME'S
EQUITY VALUE:
With respect to real estate, equity is the difference between the fair market value of
a property and the debt against that property. (See Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed.).
Although the trial court had evidence as to the debt that existed against the property three
year's prior to the date of trial, it had no evidence as to the debt against the property as of
the date of trial nor did it have any evidence of the property's fair market value. Rather than
requiring the parties to produce or submit evidence of the property's fair market value or
otherwise fashioning a remedy that would establish equity, the trial court created its own
method of determining the home's equity. It used the mortgage balance as of the date of
purchase and the mortgage balance as of the date of the parties' separation, neither of which
is a measure of fair market value. This method of calculating home equity is arbitrary,
capricious and an invalid formula for calculating home equity.
Where there is inadequate evidence to apply a standard means and method of
determining property value, the trial court should use proper discretion in devising how to
bring the necessary evidence before it or otherwise divide the subject property rather than
creating its own definition and formula. In the case ofMunnsv. Munns. 790 P.2d 116 (Utah
App. 1990), when the trial court concluded that it did not have appropriate property values
and that the valuation evidence was inadequate, it continued the hearing for presentation of
7

further appraisal information. In the case of Berger v. Berger. 713 P.2d 695, 698 (Utah
1985) the trial court utilized inconclusive and improper evidence of a property's value. The
Supreme Court concluded that the trial court had no admissible evidence as to the value of
the property and remanded the case for a new trial to determine said property's value.
The trial court in the present case, knowing that it had inadequate evidence of the
property's value, had several options within its proper discretion. It could have (1) ordered
the property sold and its net proceeds divided half to each party; (2) ordered that the parties
hire one or more appraisers to value the property and allowed plaintiff to purchase
defendant's one-half share if he did not want to sell the property; and (3) continued the trial
and ordered the parties to stipulate or submit evidence of the property's value. Any of these
approaches would have been fair and reasonable and would not have produced the
inequitable outcome for defendant that has resulted from the trial court's improper
determination of equity.
The trial court knew that the property had appreciated in value and that it was no
longer worth what the parties had originally paid for it because Exhibit "12" admitted at trial
showed that the county valued the property at $80,157.00 in 1999. (This Exhibit was not
before the court to establish the exact fair market value of the property but the court did have
the Exhibit and the valuation of the property before it). There was no reasonable basis for
the court to utilize the method of determining the home's equity as it did.
CONCLUSION
As a result of the improper finding and conclusion regarding the home's equity and
the abuse of discretion in how that home equity value was determined, appellant requests this
8

Court to reverse the trial court's order granting her judgment against the plaintiff for the sum
of $580.48 plus interest as representing her equity interest in the home and to remand the
determination of home equity value to the trial court and require said court to make its
determination on the basis of either appraisal or sale of the property.
DATED May 21, 2001.

Howard Chuntz
Attorney for Defendant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed,
postage prepaid, this JjZJ?4' &ay of May, 2001, to the following:
Ralph C. Amott
Attorney for Plaintiff
60 East 100 South, Ste. 102
Provo, UT 84606
< ^m/ysfr*^
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ADDENDUM
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99OCT-5 AH!!: 09
RALPH C. AMOTT, (#0068)
DONALD D. GILBERT (#6733)
Attorneys for Plaintiff
60 E 100 So., STE 102
PROVO UT 84606
Telephone: (801) 377-6575
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
125 NORTH 100 WEST, PROVO, UTAH 84601
DAN F. LEE,
Plaintiff,

COMPLAINT

DIVISION # "7

vs.
DORA SANDERS aka DORA BRANIN,
and John Does 1-10,

Civil N o . 9 9 - 0 ^ 0 3 5 S £

Defendants.

COMES NOW plaintiff and complains of Defendants, and for cause
of action alleges as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Equitable dissolution and division of partnership property
and/or judgment for contribution and payments of Plaintiff)

1. That Plaintiff and Defendant are residents of Utah County,
State of Utah.
2. That the property that is the subject of this lawsuit is
located in the City of American Fork, County of Utah, State of Utah
and is more particularly described as follows:
COMMENCING 132.0 FEET WEST OF THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF

BLOCK 10, PLAT A, OF THE AMERICAN FORK CITY SURVEY OF
BUILDING LOTS; THENCE NORTH 107.0 FEET; THENCE WEST 95.5 FEET;
THENCE NORTH 25.0 FEET; THENCE WEST 20.0 FEET; THENCE
SOUTH 132.0 FEET TO THE NORTH LINE OF 100 SOUTH STREET;
THENCE EAST 115.5 FEET TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING.
AREA: 0.30 ACRES.
3.
In 1994, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a
partnership by becoming record owners of the subject property
described above as unmarried individuals.
4.
Plaintiff and Defendant cohabitated at the subject
property from 1994 to November 1996.
5. In November 1996, Defendant abandoned Plaintiff and the
property, left the state for a period of time, and married, having
no further contact with Plaintiff or the property.
6.
That Plaintiff has been paying the taxes, mortgage
payments, costs of repair, maintenance and has made improvements on
the subject property for each and every year since the acquisition
in 1994 and resides there today.
7. At no time since the acquisition in 1994 has Defendant
made any contributions, or only nominal ones, towards payment of
the mortgage, costs of repair, maintenance, improvements, insurance
or taxes on the subject property.
8. That Defendant has breached the partnership agreement by
abandoning the premises and by failing to make contribution or
reimbursing for the same and the partnership should therefore be
dissolved and the property
distributed to Plaintiff in its
entirety.
9.
That Plaintiff has sought to refinance the subject
property but Defendant's name on the property is a cloud thereon
preventing refinance or sale and Defendant has refused and ignored
requests to remove her name or assign over title or even to make an
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15. Plaintiff has had actual, continuous possession and made
open, exclusive and notorious use of the property for the last
three (3) years. Said use has been under claim of right and/or
title, adverse and hostile to any interest that Defendant may
assert in the property.
16. That based on Plaintifffs sole use of the property for
many years, and Defendant's abandonment thereof, and her failure to
contribute in any meaningful way to the purchase, maintenance, or
upkeep of the property in question, and the fact that this is, and
always was, simply what the parties considered a partnership or
investment based on relative contribution to the purchase and
upkeep of the property, and based on all other allegations
heretofore set forth, that Plaintiff is entitled to an order
Quieting Title to said property in Plaintiff, free and clear of any
interest or claim of Defendant or any other person.
17. That Plaintiff is also entitled to an award of costs and
reasonable attorney fees incurred in prosecuting this quiet title
action.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(ACCOMODATION)
18.
Plaintiff realleges all prior allegations set forth
herein.
19. In the alternative, Plaintiff alleges that the taking of
this property in Defendant's name jointly with Plaintiff, was done
solely as an accomodation to Plaintiff by Defendant.
20.
That defendant knew, or should have known, that she
claimed no interest in this property and that her subsequent
behavior after taking title jointly with Plaintiff attests to this
understanding in that she made no contribution to the mortgage,
4

improvements, taxes or any other aspect of maintaining this home,
that she abandoned the same after only a short time and has
continuously abandoned it for many years.
21. That equitably Plaintiff is entitled to all equity that
has accrued in this home since its purchase based on his sole
contributions thereto, and the fact that Defendant's taking joint
title with him was a mere accomodation and intended by the parties
to endow no interest or claim on the property in Defendant.
22. That Plaintiff is entitled therefore to an order removing
Defendant's name from this property and awarding it free and clear
to Plaintiff, plus an award of costs and fees in incurred in
prosecuting this action.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendant
Branin, and all other John Does as may be identified and added
hereafter, as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. For an order of this court dissolving the partnerhsip of
the parties, to an accounting and determination of all partnership
proceeds and contributions, and to an order determining the
relative equitable value of each parties contribution to the
investment property, which Plaintiff believes should be a finding
of 100% interest in the property to Plaintiff and 0% to Defendant.
2. For an order of this court removing Defendant's name from
the property and awarding free and clear title to him, or in the
alternative granting Plaintiff a judgment against Defendant for all
contributions, payments, improvements and such as he has made on
this property, all as may be proven at trial.
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3. For an order that Defendant, and all persons or John Does
claiming interest with Defendant, have no estate, right, title,
lien or interest in or to the property or any part thereof, and
Plaintiff's interest is superior to all others.
4.
For an award of costs and attorney fees incurred in
prosecuting this action
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. For an Order of this Court quieting title to the subject
property in Plaintiff solely.
2. For an order that Defendant, and all persons or John Does
claiming interest with Defendant, have no estate, right, title,
lien or interest in or to the property or any part thereof, and
Plaintiff's interest is superior to all others»
3.
For an award of costs and attorney fees incurred in
prosecuting this action

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION:
1. For an Order of this court that Plaintiff is entitled to
an order removing Defendant's name from this property ae being
solely an accomodation signer, and awarding it free and clear to
Plaintiff, plus an award of costs and fees in incurred in
prosecuting this action.
DATED this

JI

day of September, 1999.

Ralplv^t.Amott,
Donald D. Gilbert,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
6

Howard Chuntz, No 4208
Attorney for Defendant
1149 West Center Street
Orem, UT 84057
Telephone: 801-222-9700
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
DAN F. LEE,

ANSWER
Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. f ^ ' / ^ g ^ / "

DORA SANDERS aka DORA BRANIN,
and JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendant.
/

COMES NOW defendant, Dora Sanders, by and through her attorney, Howard Chuntz,
and answers the allegations set forth in plaintiffs Complaint as follows:
1. Defendant admits the allegations set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 4 of plaintiff s
Complaint.
2. Defendant denies the allegations set forth in paragraphs 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 16, 17, 18, 19,
20, 21 and 22 of plaintiffs Complaint.
3. With respect to paragraph 5 of plaintiff s Complaint, defendant admits that she and
plaintiff separated, that she began living separately from him, that she allowed him to remain in
their home that is the subject of this litigation, that she left the State for a period of time and
married, but denies that she abandoned the subject property.
4. With respect to paragraph 9 of plaintiff s Complaint, defendant admits that her name
remains as an owner on said property and that the same may be preventing defendant from

refinancing or selling said property and that she has refused request to remove her name or assign
over title of the property to plaintiff, but denies each and every other allegation set forth therein.
5. With respect to paragraph 10 of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant admits that any
partnership that exists between the parties should be dissolved, that the subject property should be
sold and that the equity derived therefrom should be divided between the parties. Defendant
denies each and every other allegation set forth therein.
6. With respect to paragraph 12 of plaintiffs Complaint, defendant is without sufficient
knowledge or information to form an opinion or belief, and, therefore, denies the same.
7. With respect to paragraph 15 of plaintiff s Complaint, defendant admits that plaintiff
has had actual and continuance possession of the subject premises and has made open, exclusive
and notorious use of said property for the last two plus years, but denies each and every other
allegation set forth in said paragraph 15.
WHEREFORE, defendant prays that plaintiff take nothing by his Complaint, that the
Court order that the property be sold and that the equity therein be divided equally between the
parties and that defendant be awarded her costs and attorney's fees in defending this action.
DATED October 18, 1999.
/

/

/Howard Chuntz
Attorney for Defendant

'

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage
prepaid, this - C ^ d a y of October, 1999, to the following:
Ralph C. Amott
Donald D. Gilbert
Attorneys for Plaintiff
60 East 100 South, Ste. 102
Provo, UT 84606
reans
>y

?k

A7j:-,

RALPH C. AMOTT (#68)
Attorney for Plaintiff
60 East 100 South, Suite 102
Provo, Utah 84606
(801) 377-6575
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
125 NORTH 100 WEST, PROVO, UTAH 84601
DAN F. LEE,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, AND JUDGMENT and
ORDER QUIETING TITLE

vs,
DORA SANDERS aka DORA BRANIN,
and John Does 1-10,

Civil No.9904-03528

Defendants.

THIS MATTER CAME on regularly before this court for bench
trial on June 6, 2000. Plaintiff was present in person and by
and through his attorney's Ralph C.Amott and Donald D. Gilbert.
Defendant was present in person and by and through her attorney
Howard Chuntz. At issue were property claims arising from the
joint purchase and maintenance of a home by Plaintiff and
Defendant. The Court having received evidence and testimony and
heard arguments in the case, and having reviewed the case law
presented and all documentation on file with the Court, the Court
makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
1. The Court finds that Plaintiff (Dan Lee), and Defendant
(Dora Sanders), began living together in August of 1993. The
Parties lived together until October 1996 when defendant and Mr.
Lee separated. During that intervening time period the Parties
lived with Plaintiff's mother and in the home purchased by the
parties, though they did not hold themselves out as husband and
wife.
2. The Court finds that on September 14, 1994 Plaintiff and
Defendant signed as borrower and co-borrower for the purchase of

the home located in American Fork. The loan application (ex.
22), indicated that the parties —listing themselves as unmarried
persons— intended to purchase the property as joint tenants.
Exhibit 23, a copy of a document entitled "Settlement Statement,"
lists the parties as borrowers for the property in quesion. The
settlement statement indicates that the purchase price of the
property was $56,000+ costs,, totaling $58,395.26. The evidence
(ex.23), in the case established that the parties made a down
payment of $6,995.26, leaving a total balance due of $51,296.75.
No part of the down payment was paid by the Defendant.
3. The Court finds from the time of purchase of the
property in September 1994 until the end of October in 1996, the
parties lived in the home together, pooling their incomes during
the time that each was employed for the benefit of each other,
and paying the monthly mortgage on the home, either from funds
contained in a joint bank account or from Defendant's separate
bank account.
4. The Court finds that regardless of what labels are put
on the theory of recovery, as claimed in this case by the
Parties, i.e., contract, partnership or quasi-marital
relationship, the court finds that the Plaintiff and Defendant
for purpose of purchasing the property in question held
themselves out as joint tenants purchasing the property together.
The Court finds the evidence (ex. 26 copies of Defendant's
checks), established that many of the monthly mortgage payments
were in excess of the required monthly amount. From the evidence
presented, the regular monthly mortgage payment appears to be
approximately $471.00 per month.
5. The Court finds that as per exhibit 23, the beginning
balance of the amount due for the purchase of the property was
$51,296.75. The evidence shows from ex. 16 that as of October
31, 1996, the balance due was $50,135.78. The difference between
the purchase price and the price at the time Defendant left would
be the equity established by payments made. Neither Party
presented any evidence for the Court to consider with respect to

appreciation in value of the property from the time of purchase
to October 31, 1996, the time of separation, nor from the time of
purchase to the time of trial.
6. The Court finds the only way the Court has of
determining any equity in the property that is subject to
distribution is to determine the purchase price and compare it to
the balance due on a specific date, namely the separation of the
parties.
7. Based upon the evidence, the Court finds that after the
time of separation the Plaintiff continued to reside in the home
and pay the monthly mortgage payments, taxes, and insurance. No
moneys were paid by the Defendant from October 31, 1996 to the
time of trial.
8. From the evidence presented, the Court finds that as per
exhibit 23 the purchase price of the property was $51,296.75 as
of Setpember 14, 1994. The Court also finds that from exhibit
16, as of October 31, 1996, the time of separation of the
Parties, $50,135.78 was due and owing on the property.
Subtracting that amount from the original purchase price, the
Court finds that the equity established in the property by the
evidence is $1,160.97.
9. Considering the evidence, the Court finds that based
upon principles of equity (Utah Code Ann. Sea. 30-2-6 (1999)),
and partnership, the Parties, though unmarried (UCA Sec. 30-14.5), should share equally in the amount of equity found by the
Court. Therefore, the Court divides the $1,160.97 equally.
10. Defendant is entitled to $580.48 plus interest as her
equity in the property.
11. The Court finds that title is quieted to Plaintiff
against the Defendant and that an order may be entered removing
the Defendant's name from the property.

BASED ON THE FOREGOING FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, THE
COURT DOES NOW MAKE THE FOLLOWING ORDER OF JUDGMENT AND QUIET
TITLE:
1. Defendant is granted judgment against Plaintiff in the
sum of $580.48 plus interest of 10% from October 1996 until paid
in full, representing her equity interest in the home in American
Fork.
2. Plaintiff is to pay the Defendant her interest as set
forth in paragraph one immediately above on or before September
30, 2000. In the event the amount has not been paid by that
date, the home shall be placed for sale with a real estate
company and sold and Defendant paid her $580.48 plus interest
from the proceeds of the sale.
3. The home and property in American Fork is hereby quieted
in Plaintiff Dan Lee and by this order the name of Defendant Dora
Sanders aka Dora Branin is hereby removed from the title to said
property located at 22 West 100 South, American Fork, Utah, and
more particularly described as follows:
COMMENCING 132.0 FEET WEST OF THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF
BLOCK 10 PLAT "A", OF THE AMERICAN FORK CITY SURVEY OF
BUILDING LOTS; THENCE NORTH 107.0 FEET; THENCE WEST 95.5
FEET; THENCE NORTH 25.0 FEET; THENCE WEST 20.0 FEET; THENCE
SOUTH 132.0 FEET TO THE NORTH LINE OF 100 SOUTH STREET;
THENCE EAST 115.5 FEET TO THE PLACE OF BEGINNING.
4. Each party shall bear their own attorney fees and costs
in this matter.
Dated this *£ I day of Qi\r^L^^

/ 2000,

BY THE COURT: 0%-

Approved as to Form:

/

/

Howard Chunt^; Atty. for Def,

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Findings, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and Order
Quieting Title

was mailed, postage prepaid, this

July, 2000, to the following:
Howard Chuntz, Attorney
1149 West Center
Orem, Utah, 84057

/

day of
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Howard Chuntz, No. 4208
Attorney for Defendant
1149 West Center Street
Orem, UT 84057
Telephone: 801-222-9700
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
DAN F. LEE,
MOTION TO AMEND
JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
v.
DORA SANDERS aka DORA BRANIN,
and JOHN DOES 1-10,

Case No. 9904-03528
TV
-\
Vil/ J

Defendant.
/

COMES NOW defendant in the above captioned matter, by and through her attorney,
Howard Chuntz, and moves the Court, pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, to amend its Judgment. This Motion is supported by the Memorandum of Points and
Authorities submitted herewith.

Howard Chuntz
Attorney for Defendant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY/CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage
prepaid, this ^ 7 day of August, 2000, to the following:
Ralph C. Amott
Donald D. Gilbert
Attorneys for Plaintiff
60 East 100 South, Ste. 102
Provo, UT 84606
re mot

RALPH C. AMOTT (#68)
Attorney for Plaintiff
60 East 100 South, Suite 102
Provo, Utah 84606
(801) 377-6575

n ,,rth a "lina; Disirtct U>urt
Fourth 4^™
%<*?,•$ Utah
of Utaii County ^f-y
Oeputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
125 NORTH 100 WEST, PROVO, UTAH 84601
DAN F. LEE,
Plaintiff,
ORDER ON DEENDANT'S MOTION
vs
DORA SANDERS aka DORA BRANIN,
and John Does 1-10,

Civil No.9904-03528

Defendants.

D;V7

THIS MATTER came on regularly before this court for ruling
on Defendants Motion to Amend Judgment.
Objection thereto.

Plaintiff filed an

The court having reviewed all the pleadings

before it, and duly considered the same, and having heretofore
entered itfs ruling dated Sept. 21, 2000, and good cause
otherwise appearing; Now Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The main issue raised in Defendant's Motion to Amend is

that the court erred in determining the equity in the property
and that the correct way to determine it is to subtract all debt
and encumbrance balances from the property1s actual or appraised
value.

Thus, Defendant argues that the Court should have either

(1) ordered that the property be sold with Plaintiff having a
right of first refusal, and the purchase price less the mortgage
balance to be divided equally between the parties; or (2) order
the parties to have the property appraised, and determine equity

as described above.

The Court agrees that these methods are some

options available to determine equity in real property.

However,

the Court believes, based on the evidence presented at trial,
that the Court's determination of equity was appropriate.

2.

By both parties admission, neither party presented

evidence of the property's actual or appraised value at trial.
However, both the plaintiff's Complaint and Defendant's Answer
put at issue the value of the real property at issue in the
lawsuit.

Thus, both parties were on notice by reason of the

pleadings that the value of the real property and its equity
would be questions to be addresed at the time of trial.
Based upon the evidence presented by the parties at trial, a
determination was made by the Court as to equity as stated in the
Court's Ruling and above also.

Therefore, in accordance with

that evidence, the Court's determination was proper and equitable
and will stand.
Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment and Request for Oral
Argument are therefore and hereby DENIED.
DATED this /'Kday of October, 2000.
BY^HE COURT:
/i

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Order on Defendant's Motion to Amend Judgment, was mailed,
postage prepaid, this J1^ day of
- ^ c / ^ , 2000, to Howard
Chuntz, Attorney for Defendant, at 1149 West Center, Orem, Utah,
84057.

OCT ZU

Howard Chuntz, No. 4208
Attorney for Defendant
1149 West Center Street
Orem, UT 84057
Telephone: 801-222-9700
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
DAN F.LEE,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff,
v.
Case No. 9904-03528
DORA SANDERS aka DORA BRANIN,
and JOHN DOES 1-10,
Defendant.
/

Defendant, Dora Sanders, aka Dora Branin, hereby appeals to the Utah Court of Appeals
from the Judgment and Order Quieting Title entered by the Honorable Gary D. Stott on July 31,
2000, from plaintiffs Complaint.
DATED October 10, 2000.

Howard Chuntz
Attorney for Defendant

j

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage
prepaid, this /fty/day of October, 2000, to the following:
Ralph C. Amott
Donald D. Gilbert
Attorneys for Plaintiff
60 East 100 South, Ste. 102
Provo, UT 84606
re not
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1999 PROPERTY VALUATION JNOllUb
AUGUST 2 0 , 1999
- THIS IS NOT A BILL - DO NOT PAY PROPERTY LOCATION INFORMATION

)PERTY IDENTIFICATION INFORMATION
ST
#

#

060
(C )
02:023:0003
C-158

RS
(001)

COM. W 132 FT FR SE COR OF BLK 10, PLAT A, AMERICAN FORK CIT
Y SURVEY; N 107 FT; W 95-5 FT; N 25 FT; W 20 FT; S 132 FT; E
115.5 FT TO BEG. AREA .30 ACRES.
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION INFORMATION

LEE, DAN F ET AL
22 W 100 S
AMERICAN FORK UT 8 4 0 0 3 - 2 3 0 2

IF YOU DISAGREE WITH THIS YEAR'S MARKET
1
VALUE AND WANT TO FILE AN APPEAL, YOU MUST
CALL 370-8228 BEFORE SEP 20 AT 5:00 P.M. AND
PROVIDE THE SERIAL NUMBER OF THE PROPERTY
WHOSE VALUE YOU WISH TO APPEAL. NO
APPEALS WILL BE ALLOWED AFTER THIS DATE. AN
APPLICATION WILL THEN BE SENT TO YOU. THE
COMPLETED APPLICATION, TOGETHER WITH ALL
DOCUMENTATION SUPPORTING THE VALUE YOU
THINK IS APPROPRIATE MUST BE EITHER
RECEIVED BY THE CLERK OF THE BOARD AT
1
100 E CENTER, SUITE 3600, PROVO, UT 84606,
1
BEFORE THE HEARING, OR BROUGHT WITH YOU
TO YOUR HEARING.

MARKET VALUE OF YOUR PROPERTY
PROPERTY TYPE

LAST YEARS MARKET VALUE

DENT!AL

TOTAL PROPERTY VALUE

THIS YEARS MARKET VALUE

70,935

80,157

70,935

80,157

CURRENT AND PROPOSED PROPERTY TAXES
TAXING ENTITIES

TAX
LAST YEAR

NE SCHOOL DIST (BASIC)
NE SCHOOL DIST (OTHER)
ICAN FORK CITY
L ASSESSING
i COUNTY ASSESSING
COUNTY
RAL UT WATER CONS DIST
H UTAH CNTY WATER DIST

71.79
176.38
94.53
6.91
8.90
49.^7
15.^9
1.68

NE SCHOOL DIST JDGMENT
ICAN FORK CITY JDGMENT
L ASSESSING JUDGEMENT

1.91
I.83
• 35

TOTAL PROPERTY TAX

429.23

TAX THIS YEAR IF .
NO CHANGE

PROPOSED BUDGET

81.12
191.42
99.33
8.55
9.83
53.17
17.63
1.76

81.12
226.25
99-33
8.55

462.82

^97.65

0

A PUBLIC BUDGET
MEETING WILL BE HELD:

SEPT 14TH AT 7:00 PM
575 N. 100 E. AMER FRK

0 0

53.17
17.63
1.76

PLEASE READ OTHER SIDE

|

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with
the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in
his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
The Constitution of the United States, Amendment VI, 1791.

76-6-405. Theft by deception
(1)A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of
another by deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
(2)Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to
matters having no pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to
deceive ordinary persons in the group addressed. "Puffing" means an exaggerated
commendation of wares or worth in communications addressed to the public or to a
class or group.
Utah Code
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code

76-6-501. Forgery- "Writing" defined
(1) A person is guilty of forgery if, with purpose to defraud anyone, or with
knowledge that he is facilitating a fraud to be perpetrated by anyone, he:
(a)alters any writing of another without his authority or utters any such
altered writing; or
(b) makes, completes, eecutes, authenticates, issues, transfers, publishes, or
utters any writing so that the writing or the making, completion, execution,
authentication, issuance, transference, publication or utterance purports to be the
act of another, whether the person is existent or nonexistent, or purports to have
been executed at a time or place or in a numbered sequence other than was in fact
the case, or to be a copy of an original when no such original existed.
(2) As used in this section, "writing" includes printing, electronic storage or
transmission, or any other method of recording valuable information including
forms such as:
(a) checks, tokens, stamps, seals, credit cards, badges, trademarks, money,
and any other symbols of value, right, privilege, or identification;
(b) a security, revenue stamp, or any other instrument or writing issued by a
government or any agency; or
(c) a check, an issue of stocks, bonds, or any other instrument or writing
representing an interest in or claim against property, or a pecuniary interest in or
claim against any person or enterprise.
(d) Forgery is a felony of the third degree.
Utah Code
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code

77-32-101. Indigent Defense Act.
This chapter is known as the "Indigent Defense Act."
Utah Code
Title 77 Utah Code of Criminal Procedure

77-32-301. Minimum standards for defense of an indigent.
Each county, city, and town shall provide for the defense of an indigent in crin i
cases in the courts and various administrative bodies of the state in accordance
with the following minimum standards:
(1) provide counsel for each indigent who faces the substantial probability of
the deprivation of the indigent's liberty;
(2) afford timely representation by competent legal counsel;
(3) provide the investigatory resources necessary for a complete defense;
(4) assure undivided loyalty of defense counsel to the client;
(5) proceed with a first appeal of right; and
(6) prosecute other remedies before or after a conviction, considered by
defense counsel to be in the interest of justice except for other and subsequent
discretionary appeals or discretionary writ proceedings.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 354, 1997 General Session
Utah Code
Title 77 Utah Code of Criminal Procedure

77-32-302. Assignment of counsel on request of indigent or order of court.
(1) Legal counsel shall be assigned to represent each indigent and the indigent
shall also be provided access to defense resources necessary for an effective
defense, if the indigent is under arrest for or charged with a crime in which there is
a substantial probability that the penalty to be imposed is confinement in either jail
or prison if:
(a) the indigent requests counsel or defense resources, or both; or
(b) the court on its own motion or otherwise orders counsel, defense
resources, or both and the defendant does not affirmatively waive or reject on the
record the opportunity to be represented and provided defense resources.
(2) (a) If a county responsible for providing indigent legal defense, including
counsel and defense resources, has established a county legal defender's office and
the court has received notice of the establishment of the office, the court shall
assign to the county legal defender's office the responsibility to defend indigent
defendants within the county and provide defense resources.
(b) If the county or municipality responsible to provide for the legal defense
of an indigent, including defense resources and counsel, has arranged by contract
to provide those services through a legal aid association, and the court has received
notice or a copy of the contract, the court shall assign the legal aid association
named in the contract to defend the indigent and provide defense resources.
(c) If the county or municipality responsible for providing indigent legal
defense, including counsel and defense resources, has contracted to provide those
services through individual attorneys, individual defense resources, or associations
providing defense resources, and the court has received notice or a copy of the
contracts, the court shall assign a contracting attorney as the legal counsel to
represent an indigent and a contracted defense resource to provide defense-related
services.
(d) If no county legal defender's office exists, the court shall select and
assign an attorney or defense resource if:
(i) the contract for indigent legal services is with multiple attorneys or
resources; or
(ii) the contract is with another attorney in the event of a conflict of
interest.
(e) If the court considers the assignment of a noncontracting attorney or
defense resource to provide legal services to an indigent defendant despite the
existence of an indigent legal services contract and the court has a copy or notice

of the contract, before the court may make the assignment, it shall:
(i) set the matter for a hearing;
(ii) give proper notice of the hearing to the attorney of the responsible
county or municipality; and
(iii) make findings that there is a compelling reason to appoint a
noncontracting attorney or defense resource.
(f) The indigent's preference for other counsel or defense resources may not
be considered a compelling reason justifying the appointment of a noncontracting
attorney or defense resource.
(3) The court may make a determination of indigency at any time.
Amended by Chapter 49, 2006 General Session
Utah Code
Title 77 Utah Code of Criminal Procedure

77-32-303. Standard for court to appoint noncontracting attorney or defense
resource — Hearing.
If a county or municipality has contracted for, or otherwise made
arrangements for, the legal defense of indigents, including a competent attorney
and defense resources, the court may not appoint a noncontracting attorney or
resource either under this part, Section 78B-1-151, or Rule 15, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure, unless the court:
(1) conducts a hearing with proper notice to the responsible entity to consider
the authorization or designation of a noncontract attorney or resource; and
(2) makes a finding that there is a compelling reason to authorize or designate a
noncontracting attorney or resources for the indigent defendant.
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session.
Utah Code
Title 77 Utah Code of Criminal Procedure

Rule 1.1. Competence.
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.
Rule 1.3. Diligence.
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a
client.
Comment
...[3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than
procrastination. A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage
of time or the change of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer
overlooks a statute of limitations, the client's legal position may be destroyed. Even
when the client's interests are not affected in substance, however, unreasonable
delay can cause a client needless anxiety and undermine confidence in the lawyer's
trustworthiness. A lawyer's duty to act with reasonable promptness, however, does
not preclude the lawyer from agreeing to a reasonable request for a postponement
that will not prejudice the lawyer's client.
Rule 1.16. Declining or terminating representation.
(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a
client if:
...(b)(6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the
lawyer or as been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; ...

Rule 3.2. Expediting Litigation.
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the
interests of the client.
Comment
[1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Although
there will be occasions when a lawyer may properly seek a postponement for
personal reasons, it is not proper for a lawyer to routinely fail to expedite litigation
solely for the convenience of the advocates. Nor will a failure to expedite be
reasonable if done for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to
obtain rightful redress or repose. The standard is whether a competent lawyer
acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having some substantial
purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise
improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client.

Rule 6.1. Voluntary Pro Bono Legal Service.
Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those
unable to pay. A lawyer should aspire to render at least 50 hours of pro bono
publico legal services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should:
...(c) A lawyer may also discharge the responsibility to provide pro bono publico
legal services by making an annual contribution of at least $10 per hour for each
hour not provided under paragraph (a) or (b) above to an agency that provides
direct services as defined in paragraph (a) above.

Rule 6.2. Accepting Appointments.
A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person
except for good cause, such as:
...(b) Representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden
on the lawyer; or

Excerpts from Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration, Chapter 13,
Rules of Professional Conduct

Rule 1.1. Competence.
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation
requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary
for the representation.
Rule 1.3. Diligence.
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.
Comment
...[3] Perhaps no professional shortcoming is more widely resented than procrastination.
A client's interests often can be adversely affected by the passage of time or the change
of conditions; in extreme instances, as when a lawyer overlooks a statute of limitations,
the client's legal position may be destroyed. Even when the client's interests are not
affected in substance, however, unreasonable delay can cause a client needless anxiety
and undermine confidence in the lawyer's trustworthiness. A lawyer's duty to act with
reasonable promptness, however, does not preclude the lawyer from agreeing to a
reasonable request for a postponement that will not prejudice the lawyer's client.
Rule 1.14. Client with Diminished Capacity.
...(b) When the lawyer reasonably believes that the client has diminished capacity, is at
risk of substantial physical, financial or other harm unless action is taken and cannot
adequately act in the client's own interest, the lawyer may take reasonably necessary
protective action, including consulting with individuals or entities that have the ability to
take action to protect the client and, in appropriate cases, seeking the appointment of a
guardian ad litem, conservator or guardian.

Rule 1.16. Declining or terminating representation.
(b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a client
if:
...(b)(6) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer
or as been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; ...

Rule 3.2. Expediting Litigation.
A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests
of the client.
Comment
[1] Dilatory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Although there
will be occasions when a lawyer may properly seek a postponement for personal
reasons, it is not proper for a lawyer to routinely fail to expedite litigation solely for the
convenience of the advocates. Nor will a failure to expedite be reasonable if done for the
purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain rightful redress or repose.
The standard is whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course
of action as having some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or
other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of
the client.

Rule 6.1. Voluntary Pro Bono Legal Service.
Every lawyer has a professional responsibility to provide legal services to those unable
to pay. A lawyer should aspire to render at least 50 hours of pro bono publico legal
services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should:
...(c) A lawyer may also discharge the responsibility to provide pro bono publico legal
services by making an annual contribution of at least $10 per hour for each hour not
provided under paragraph (a) or (b) above to an agency that provides direct services as
defined in paragraph (a) above.

Rule 6.2. Accepting Appointments.
A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except
for good cause, such as:
...(b) Representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable financial burden on the
lawyer; or

Excerpts from Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration, Chapter 13, Rules
of Professional Conduct

